

The Domestic Environment of International Relations in Nigeria

Remi Chukwudi Okeke

Department of Public Administration
Madonna University, Okija Campus, Nigeria

Muoneke Chukwuemeka Vincent

Department of Political Science
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria

Jude Odigbo

Department of Political Science
Madonna University, Okija Campus, Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper examined the domestic environment of international relations by conducting a study of the Nigerian state, under the Buhari administration. It investigated the nature of the linkages between the domestic environment and international altercations or cooperation. Where previous works concentrated on how the domestic setting influenced foreign policy-output and consequent international reaction(s), this contribution focused on how the domestic environment begot foreign policy reaction from the other actors on the international podium. The general objective of the study was to determine the character of the international relations which Nigeria's domestic environment begets. A specific objective of the work was to identify some trajectories of these general tendencies under the Buhari administration. The study was framed on behaviouralism, bordering on man and his behaviour in states and organizations. The work adopted a qualitative methodology with secondary sources of data consulted. It found that Nigeria's domestic environment has continued to weaken its giant-sized international capabilities. The country's domestic impairments have consequently continued to beget for the African giant state, frequent scornful diplomatic relations from the other actors on the international scene. Corruption, egotism and venality of the leadership class remained the central contributory issues in the nation's domestic derailments. The work recommends the institution of strong and altruistic leadership, as panaceas against disorder in the domestic environment of international relations in the case study state.

Keywords: *Domestic environment of international relations, the Nigerian state, Buhari administration in Nigeria, international relations, international politics*

Introduction

The nexus between domestic politics and international relations has over the years garnered significant research attention (Kaarbo, 2015; Cantir & Kaarbo, 2016; Eksteen, 2019; Saroha, 2019). Existing studies have however extensively concentrated on how the domestic setting influences foreign policy-output and consequent international reaction(s). This contribution deviates from the orthodoxy to focus on how the domestic environment inherently begets foreign policy-reaction from the other actors on the international podium. Nigeria is Africa's most populated country, with an estimated population of over 206 million people, and ranks seventh on the world's list of most populated countries (Worldometer, 2020). The population of this nation makes the linkages between her domestic milieu and international relations worthy of continuing critical research consideration.

The general objective of the contribution is to determine the character of the international relations which Nigeria's domestic environment begets. A specific objective of the work is to identify some trajectories of these general tendencies under the Buhari administration. The Buhari administration's lifespan in the country began in May 2015 and was on its fifth year of existence at the commencement time of this research work. The methodology of the paper is principally qualitative, with the attendant expositions validated by secondary sources of data. The significance of the study is locatable in the burning desirability of projecting more authoritative African voices in global affairs. The study consequently proceeds in this order: exposition of the theoretical framework, explication of selected domestic scenarios and further illustrations based on a modest range of international cases. The paper's inquisitions and discourses continued with the section entitled: from combative to weak-willed executive-legislature relations. This was followed by the segment of the work framed on repositioning the international relations nexus. Then there was the conclusion.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of the paper is behaviourism, which refers to the viewpoint that the focus of political science needed to be limited to objectively observable and quantifiable incidents. Behaviourism assumes that political institutions mainly echo the principal social forces; hence political studies should actually begin with public opinion, culture and society. Therefore, behaviourists would use the approaches of psychology to arrive at statistical linkages between dependent variables (assumed effects) and independent variables (assumed causes). For instance, they might utilize in depth election data, to contend that voters in urban centres generally prefer more liberal candidates while countryside dwellers vote for more conservative candidates. The influence of behaviourists in the post-World War II era, in any case, helped in leading political science in better scientific regards (Braat et al., 2020; Hafner-Burton et al., 2017; Roskin, 1999; Trepanier, 2020).

Behaviouralism subsequently influenced international relations (Roskin, 1999). Ofoegbu (1980, p18) depicts the behavioural framework of analysis in international relations as micro analytical, under the methodological hue of which "man and his behaviour rather than states and organizations are identified as crucial variables in analysis". Figure 1 of the study, as captured

below, depicts the conventional understanding of how foreign policy outputs, actions and focus, are functions of the domestic environment. But in figure 2, the paper demonstrates how the domestic environment reconditions the abilities and thoughts sizes, invariably the behaviours and roles of individual diplomats, as representatives of their states in international relations. Inversely in this conceptualization, figure 2 further elucidates the behaviours of the individual actors of the other side, towards a state, on account of the inadequacies and impairments of the state's domestic environment.

The domestic environment of Nigeria's international relations provides the stimulus-response context of this behaviouralism in this study. Siddiqui (2020, p.1) further adds to these expositions that even though "states are made up of individuals, states do not make decisions, but the people within states do" and "a glance at a state's relations with the world through a behaviouralist lens can bring insightful observations to the table" (Siddiqui, 2020, p.4).




Figure 1: Foreign policy actions as simple functions of the domestic environment




Figure 2: A stimulus/response matrix of the domestic environment of International Relations

EXPLICATING SELECTED DOMESTIC SCENARIOS IN NIGERIA

Extreme Poverty Occasioning Citizens' Desperation

The verve of daily activities in the Nigerian cities and semi-urban locations paradoxically conceals the high degree of poverty and existential miseries under which the bulk of the nation's over 200 million citizens lives. But this majority of the underclass of course does not reside in the urban centers. They reside in locations where they are increasingly noted by officialdom as ingredients of national statistical estimates and all such renditions. A few years ago, the country was internationally categorized as the poverty capital of the world (Kazeem, 2018). Then Nigeria's bursting youths (attempting to evade the looming condemnation to lives of seeming interminable environmental infirmity) elected to become globally dreaded scammers, to the level that the fear of Nigerian scammers became the beginning of international wisdom (Dellinger, 2019; Epstein, 2019; Farivar, 2019; Nwaubani, 2019; Orjinmo, 2019; Kazeem, 2020; Olisah, 2020a; Scamwatch, 2020).

An Incapacitated National Security Architecture

Nations of the world possess their different shares of security challenges. But what probably make the insecurity situation in Nigeria spectacular are the prevarications and suspected complicities of the power elite in perpetuating the hideous scenarios (Duke et al., 2017; Solomon, 2017; Mules, 2020). Checkmating the Boko Haram terrorist offensives in different parts of Northern Nigeria, and particularly the North Eastern sections was one of the campaign pledges upon which the Buhari regime was initially elected in 2015, and then subsequently returned to power in 2019 (Ajala, 2019; Mbah, 2019). Boko Haram had since continued to slaughter people in their different areas of operation, while the government lives in denial of this tragic reality (Kriesch, 2019; Mosch, 2019; CSW, 2020; Kola, 2020). Under the Buhari administration also, an unidentifiable group of killers parade various regions of the country engaging in multifarious slaying of Nigerian citizens, and the slaughterers are usually called Fulani herdsmen (Akpor-Robaro & Lanre-Babalola, 2018; Iloanya & Anowai, 2018).

There has been of course also an escalation in the age long Fulani herders-local farmers' horrendously fatal clashes in different regions of the country (Asogwa & Okafor, 2016; Ikezue & Ezeah, 2017; Dare & Oyeniran, 2020; Lenshie & Jacob, 2020). It is in summation, an eerie scenario of sundry killings, criminalities and banditry in the country (Nwagboso, 2018; Isah & Isuwa, 2019; Adibe, 2020; Crisis group, 2020; Maclean, 2020; Mosadomi, 2020; Oikhala, 2020). The national security hierarchy is seemingly incapacitated and helpless in effectively impeding the vicious attacks of these enemies of the people. The President was severally requested from separate quarters of the country to relieve the nation's Service Chiefs (the leadership of the national security architecture) of their duties (Bello, 2020; Elumoye, 2020; HassanWuyo, 2020; Iroanusi, 2020).

Egotism and Venality of the Political Class

Egotism and venality have remained prominent hallmarks of the political class in the country. Members of the leadership teams persist in being corrupt. It begins to seem as if politics and public service in Nigeria are synonymous with elite thievery and duplicity. Under the Buhari administration, Mr. Ibrahim Magun, the Acting Chairman of the flagship anti-corruption agency in the country, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was officially reported to President Buhari by the nation's Minister of Justice, for personally re-looting the funds and properties already recovered from the earlier looters of the Nigerian state's treasury and other resources (Asadu, 2020; Odo, 2020). Inversely, the mass media in the country became instantly inundated with counter-accusations of corruption against the crusading Justice Minister (Sahara Reporters, 2020). Previously in the administration, the President's late Chief of Staff (Mallam Abba Kyari) was also severally impugned for corruption (Olowolagba, 2018; Sahara Reporters, 2016). Then his seemingly de facto successor whose official designation was Private Secretary to the President, subsequently entered the limelight in the hierarchy of suspected and confirmed sleazy and egotist servants of Nigeria (Kperogi, 2020).

Under the venal dispositions of the egotistic political class, political parties became mere constitutional compulsions for the contest of elections. The country's politicians at all levels keep moving from one political party to another, in other to context the next election. Then as the politicians rotate from one party to the other, they frequently return to the previous parties, only to still depart to the next opportunistic political forum called party (Nwachukwu (2020; Ukpogon, 2020). Indeed, there are very few Nigerian politicians who possess the capacity to be

identified continuously with a single political party. Consequently, political parties in the country are seemingly bereft of interest articulation competences in foreign policy matters.

A MODEST RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL CASES

Xenophobia in South Africa

During the last wave of xenophobic attacks against citizens of other African countries in South Africa, there were actually retaliatory attacks on South African businesses in Nigeria and diplomatic outrage by the Nigerian authorities. Nigeria in such regards boycotted the World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting which took place in Cape Town (South Africa), temporarily closed South African missions in Abuja and Lagos (Nigeria) and recalled her ambassador to the belligerent country. It has been argued that Nigerians were not usually, specifically targeted during such South African xenophobia. South Africa subsequently apologized to Nigeria over the last spate of xenophobic attacks which led to tensed relations between the two countries. A South African special envoy presented an apology to Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari. The envoy, Jeff Radebe, expressed South Africa's "sincerest apologies" to Nigeria, at a meeting in the Nigerian capital, Abuja (Khadiagala, 2019; BBC News, 2019). But why do more Nigerian citizens (inclusive of Nigerian leaders) love to reside in South Africa than South Africans wishing to reside in Nigeria, the putative giant of the continent? This is a question that must continue to agitate the minds of Nigerian diplomatic actors in their Nigeria-South Africa relations. The answers to such questions are actually the true determinants of who operates from positions of international relations superiority in the two countries' diplomacy, irrespective of who rendered apologies to the other party.

United States Vs Akinwumi Adesina in the African Development Bank (AfDB)

The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) was founded in 1964. The constituent institutions of the group are currently as follows: the African Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF). Shareholders of the AfDB are made up of 54 African countries called regional member countries and 26 non-African countries, known as non-regional member countries. The mission of the Group is the promotion of sustainable economic growth, and the reduction of poverty in Africa. Consequently, the AfDB exclusively covers Africa, is headquartered in Africa, and the president is at all times, African. Akinwumi Adesina, Nigeria's former Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, was elected as the 8th President of the bank in 2015. He was the very first Nigerian citizen to be elected president of the banking institution (AfDB, 2020; Kenton, 2022; Mohammed, 2015).

The United States of America (US), with 6.5% shareholding position is among the 26 non-African members of the AfDB and the second largest shareholder of the bank. Nigeria is the highest shareholder, with 9.1% position. In January 2020, ahead of the bank's annual general meeting in August, where Adesina was expected to be re-elected unopposed as president, there arose a string of abuse of office and corruption allegations against the Nigerian AfDB president from his own staff. Adesina denied all the accusations, describing them as unprecedented efforts by his accusers to prejudice the bank's governance processes and tarnish his reputation. The US rejected an original investigation that exonerated him of all charges. The bank's Ethics Committee had cleared Adesina of all charges against him and recommended that the board of

governors follow its recommendations (Devermont, 2020; Madowo, 2020; Okeke & Eze, 2021; Okeke et al., 2021).

The whistleblower "Group of Concerned Staff Members of the AfDB" further posited that the Ethics Committee failed to consider their concerns. Mr. Steve Mnuchin, the US Treasury Secretary personally signed the letter to the board of AfDB rejecting the in-house investigation, which cleared Mr Adesina. According to Mr. Mnuchin, the US feared that the wholesale dismissal of all the allegations without apposite scrutiny would smear the reputation of the bank as an institution that does not uphold high standards of governance and ethics, thus the United States could not support the dismissing of the allegations at that internal investigation stage. The US called for an independent investigation into the allegations. Non-regional member countries such as Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden supported the US position. Nigeria and the other 53 African (regional member) countries stood solidly behind Mr Adesina (Devermont, 2020; Madowo, 2020; Okeke & Eze, 2021; Okeke et al., 2021).

Adesina, named Forbes Africa Person of the Year 2013, for his "brave reforms" in Nigeria's farming sector, is classifiable among the country's best representatives, in the behavioural framework of international relations, to which this contribution subscribes. His biography (AfDB, 2020) showcases an irreproachable pedigree of academic exploits, professional abilities, international management and administrative experience, embellished with top-ranking global recognition. The pro-Adesina interventionists and commentators on the associated Nigeria-America face-off on this case, depose that the US wants to stop Adesina from being re-elected president. They see the US position as anti-African, possibly leading to the country's divestment from the AfDB. But why would the United States incline towards such tendencies. The anti-African accusation is not totally credible. The US knows that only Africans can be president of the bank. The divestment thesis does not also possess immense unnerving auguries for the AfDB and Africa (Meyer, 2020; Odunsi, 2020; Ugbodaga, 2020).

The Chinese are currently not shareholders of the bank. China's interest in progressively entering the political economy of Africa is overt and indisputable. Against the further background of the bipolar ambitions of China against the United States, the authorities in Beijing would readily accept an invitation to make a compensating investment in the African Development Bank if the US pulls out. The seeming American anti-corruption crusade in the AfDB therefore increasingly and squarely smacked of rejecting the Adesina-persona. This invariably translates to impugning the Nigerian personage. Are the Americans being squarely irrational and eccentric or are there negative domestic backdrops in Nigeria lending impetus to the US position? After Adesina's "brave reforms" in Nigeria's farming sector, which earned him the high-status Forbes Africa Person of the Year 2013, as the country's Agriculture and Rural Development Minister, between 2011 and 2015, the food insecurity crises in the African leading state have remained pervasively intense (Obi, Bartolini & D'Haese, 2018; Ajie, 2019; Gavrilova & Denisova, 2019; Aboaba, Fadiji & Hussayn, 2020; Akanni, 2020).

The Nigerian agricultural revolution narratives on which the Adesina international reputation is usually partly framed therefore become disputable. This supposition does not dispute the personal integrity of the AfDB president but is actually illustrative of the frailty of the Nigerian domestic credentials which invariably begets foreign relations' negative responses. The Adesina-credentials on this score remain impaired. Additionally, the summation of the American position on the AfDB affair is metaphorical of how the US actors in international relations regard

the generic Nigerian character on issues of corruption. It may not be Adesina that was on trial but the story of unbridled corruption in Nigeria that was under allusion.

When Ghana Pulled down Nigeria's Embassy Building

In June 2020, an angry Ghanaian entered the staff quarters of Nigeria's High Commission in his country and began to destroy the buildings. He claimed that the property was located on his parcel of land. The man previously appeared with evidence to prove his claim, began to knock down the fence of the building and his action was not repelled. Even when the Nigerian High Commission petitioned the Ghanaian government about the development, there was no reaction. Days later, the man returned to the premises with bulldozers and some armed men, threatening the staff of the embassy and pulled down the buildings. Police officers who arrived at the scene of the demolition did nothing to stop the enraged Ghanaian and his collaborators. The Nigerian authorities in Abuja, Nigeria, later described the incident as the handiwork of criminals, demanding urgent action from their Ghanaian counterparts in finding the perpetrators of the act. The Nigerian officials further urged the Ghanaians to provide adequate protection for Nigerians and their property in their country (Egbas, 2020). This particular attack was not the first time the residency of the Nigerian high Commission in Ghana was being threatened by intimidation from the host country (Erezi, 2020).

Ghana's President Nana Akufo-Addo subsequently called Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari to apologize. President Akufo-Addo ordered an investigation into the incident. Two people were arrested over the matter and charged with "unlawful entry and causing unlawful damage". Nigerian citizens residing in Ghana staged a demonstration to condemn the development. Ghana's foreign ministry said it regretted the incident, announced that security had been increased at the premises. Former Ghanaian President, John Mahama, condemned the incident, criticizing the incumbent government, expressing surprise at how such a noisy and violent demolition could occur without the nation's security network picking up the signals to promptly intervene (Olulode, 2020). Speaker of Nigeria's House of Representatives, Femi Gbajabiamila, expressed sadness over the incident. In an intercourse with his Ghanaian counterpart, Hon. Aaron Mike Oquaye, over the issue, the Ghanaian Speaker reassured him of the respects and regards the people of Ghana have for Nigeria (Nwabughio, 2020). The Nigerian House of Representatives had earlier requested President Buhari to invoke the principle of reciprocity in international relations against Ghana over the incident (Agbakwuru & Salem, 2020).

But beyond all the diplomatic swaggers and the counterbalancing political niceties on the opposite sides, Nigerians know that the international community is aware that her egregious domestic impediments have made the country highly weak-willed in international relations. Wealthy Nigerians send their children abroad to Ghana in order to obtain quality and functional education (Campbell, 2018). Ekundayo (2019) demonstrates that education in Nigeria is in total danger. Furthermore, a 2017 report claimed that Nigerians spent N300bn annually to obtain tertiary education in Ghana, quite above an estimated N162bn annually they spent in the United Kingdom (Nwogu, 2017). Campbell reiterates that corruption denies millions of Nigerian citizens, access to quality education in their country. Acheampong (2019) found that the principal motivation for Nigerian immigrants who go to Ghana to participate in business was stable power supply. The story of Nigeria's stunted nature in electricity power generation is

dispiriting, and borders again on corruption (Eneasato & Mbaeze, 2019; Idowu, Ibieta & Olukotun, 2019; Roy, Iwuamadi & Ibrahim, 2020). A nation with such domestic debilitations cannot expect to command continuously momentous deference and veneration from others in international relations.

FROM COMBATIVE TO WEAK-WILLED EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATURE RELATIONS

National parliaments can influence foreign policy. In very generic terms, foreign policies are subsets of public policy. And if parliamentarians are key actors in public policymaking, they are invariably actors in foreign policy designs and directions (Malamud & Stavridis, 2011). There is also the reality of parliamentarians (particularly through their inter-parliamentary meetings and other intercourses) engaging in parliamentary diplomacy, otherwise called parlomacy (Fiott, 2011). But it needs to be noted that there are inhibitions to what parlomacy can achieve. There are issues of availability of time and expertise, membership (dis-)continuities and even funding, and so on, making some critics to dismiss parlomacy as mere 'parliamentary tourism' (Malamud & Stavridis, 2011). But the paper is returning squarely to its domestic contexts as they possess bearing with international relations, and in such regards focusing on the character of the executive-legislature relations under the Buhari administration.

As a matter of records, the Buhari regime started on combative notes between the executive arm of government and the legislature (the National Assembly) which lasted the whole of the first four years of the administration. Dr Bukola Saraki and Alhaji Yakubu Dogara, who emerged Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives respectively, defied the wishes of their party's leadership and that of President Buhari to seek and obtain their legislative leadership positions (Stein, 2015). The All Progressives Congress (APC) obtained an ostensibly convenient majority in the national legislature. The leadership of the party and the new President of the nation then had their anointed candidates for the two coveted political positions in the Senate and the House of Representatives. But Saraki and Dogara who actually joined APC from a dissenting arm of the people's Democratic Party (PDP), turned back to their former colleagues in the PDP to wrestle the legislative offices from the preferred candidates of their extant political party (APC). This disconcerting deployment of political legerdemain by the budding legislative leadership couple then set the singular tone of the combative executive-legislature relations that lasted the entire first tenure of the Buhari administration. Saraki and Dogara actually returned to the PDP eventually, while retaining their positions as Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives. This was of course under highly unpredictable schemas. The specific political party with majority members in the two branches of the National Assembly frequently became contentious as the legislators moved from one party to the other (Stein, 2015; Ayitogo, 2018; Baker, 2018; Egbejule, 2019).

Incidentally, after the 2019 General Elections, Saraki did not return to the National Assembly, Dogara who returned under the PDP was now in a disadvantaged minority party. The 2015 anointed candidates for their two previous positions, Dr Ahmed Lawan and Mr Femi Gbajabiamila, made it back to the national legislature still under the APC, and then easily emerged Senate President and Speaker respectively, with an APC reliable majority in the National Assembly (Stein, 2015; Ayitogo, 2018; Baker, 2018; Egbejule, 2019). The second tenure of the Buhari administration thus became hoisted on executive-legislative relations assumed to be framed on cooperation. However, this new position of governmental rapport

fatefully gave rise to the domestic scenario of lethargic harmony between the two arms of government. The international relations implications of the embedded tendencies are treated in the next section of this paper.

REPOSITIONING THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS NEXUS

The other states and different non-state actors in the international arena are increasingly aware of Nigeria's domestic incapacitations, principally bordering on the dreary displays of the nation's political class. For instance, erroneously or accurately, they see many Nigerians as scammers. Meanwhile, the nation's political leadership appears incapable of catalyzing positive developments at home, to reduce the tendency of desperate citizens continuing to internationalize their swindling schemes. Other participants in global affairs progressively perceive the country's military as weak, when they continue to see the nation's armed forces fiercely challenged by Boko Haram terrorists and other criminal elements. Moreover, other international actors know that in the Nigerian nation the award of contracts is celebrated more than the completion of the putative projects. The venal profits are usually in the contract awards not that the announced programmes are convincingly for anyone's benefits.

The lethargic harmonious relations between the executive and legislative arms of government in the country easily gave the leaders of the nation away as faint-hearted people, incapable of brewing resoluteness in international relations. On some side-splitting and apparently disorderly occasions, the legislature in particular would set off what appeared to the lawmakers as ardent constitutional roles in checking the excesses of the executive arm of government. Hence, in the second half of 2020 there was a moving occurrence in such regards. President Buhari had, approved the employment of 774, 000 Nigerians to cushion the effects of the economic hardships precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Under this scheme, 1, 000 Nigerians, each of who would earn N20, 000 (twenty thousand naira) on monthly basis for a period of three months were to be recruited from each of the 774 local government areas in the country. The programme was billed to start in October 2020. On June 30, the Joint Committee of Nigeria's National Assembly (The Senate and the House of Representatives) on Employment, Labour and Productivity, summoned the Minister of Employment, Labour and Productivity, and the Director General of the National Directorate of Employment, to brief the legislators on the steps being taken by the Ministry to recruit the 774, 000 workers (Umoru, 2020; Aborisade et al., 2020).

The substantive Minister was represented by the Minister of State who was supervising the National Directorate of Employment on the programme for which N52bn was already appropriated by the National Assembly. In the course of the Minister's appearance before the committee, there was an altercation between him and the lawmakers. Media reports later suggested the Minister was ordered out of the committee room by the lawmakers, while he in turn said the legislators only allowed him to take his leave. The nation's National Assembly subsequently announced the suspension of the Special Public Works programme by the parliament. The parliamentarians advised the President of the country to challenge the legislative decision in court if he so desired. The lawmakers posited that the programme never exclusively belonged to the President but was jointly initiated by the executive and the national legislature. Hence, the lawmakers must be part of its implementation. The Minister of state said the

legislature lacked the powers to suspend the programme, insisting he would continue with the on-going recruitment exercise (Umoru, 2020; Aborisade et al., 2020).

The executive-legislature disagreement actually started when the lawmakers accused the Minister of engaging in irregular recruitments without the active participation of the National Directorate of Employment. This led to verbal altercations between both parties, which became intensified when the Minister refused to tender apologies as demanded by the legislators (for raising his voice against them). In announcing the scheme's suspension, the Nigerian National Assembly said it was worried about the effective and proper implementation of the programme by the executive branch of government and wished to restate the lawmakers' commitment to its successful implementation. The legislators in their pronouncement reminded Nigerians that they were among the initiators of the programme, approved it as the legislature, appropriated funds for its execution, reemphasizing that it was never an exclusively presidential project but a project the members were participating in, for the purpose of addressing the COVID-19 challenges in the country (Umoru, 2020; Aborisade et al., 2020).

According to the legislators, the National Assembly is part of government and there must not be any exclusivity in the execution of any programme. The Minister at the center of the controversy in turn insisted that the powers of the legislature under the 1999 Constitution over such matters are only limited to investigations, and precludes parliament from issuing directives to the executive on projects implementation (Umoru, 2020; Aborisade et al., 2020). Apparently tucked away inside the foregoing episode is the fact of N52 billion having been appropriated for the programme. The principal worry of the legislators in this case fundamentally relate with the possibilities of only the Minister of State being in charge of another seeming largesse for elite plunder. This has necessitated the bizarre position of the Nigerian national legislature claiming to be one arm of government with the executive in the conceiving and execution of projects.

In all of these executive-legislature project-execution political brawls, it is not likely that it occurred to any of the furious legislators that the N20, 000 per programme-participant in a month, translated to only about \$1.40 a day, at the prevailing naira-dollar exchange rate of N460-\$1. Meanwhile, the extant international poverty line was \$1.90 (Olisah, 2020b; Kenton, 2020; Ferreira, Jolliffe & Prydz, 2015). In other words, the parliament was purely pushing to participate in the sharing of poverty to Nigerian people. In addition, the employment exercise was only meant to last for three months, and the beneficiaries would be thrown back into the shark-infested labour market in the country.

The executive and the legislature may in the nature of political dynamics engage in frosty or cordial relationships, provided that the national interest is at the center of their controversies. However, the contentions and cordialities in the period of this study were hardly about national interests. The economy of the nation remained in infirmity. The generic unemployment position was biting. National insecurity became largely unabated. Nationwide progress was mainly fixated in the austere imaginations of the egotistical political class. Besides the exponential degree of information-availability on the international front (made possible by the ubiquitous internet) various diplomatic missions in all nations on earth observe what obtains in the domestic arena of their host countries. They accordingly relay official feedback to their home state-actors in such regards. All Nigerian-based missions therefore also observe their hosts on daily bases. They consequently express informed opinions to officials in their home states on the representative tendencies of Nigerian leaders (whom they are bound to engage with, in

international relations). They would then inform their home officials that their hosts are heavily enamored by boring and infertile issues. Domestic environment and international relations are indubitably interrelated.

Despite occasional attempts at sounding resolute therefore, the Nigerian state increasingly became a pliant nation, usually speaking in predictably reconciliatory tones, whenever breathtaking issues emanated in the country's international relations. The thesis of this intervention is however not hoisted on an advocacy for consummate belligerence and pugnacity in Nigeria's international affairs. Nevertheless, when some otherwise assumed national giants and expectant continental behemoths become the continual recipients of diplomatic effrontery, the receiver-nation's spokespersons may also occasionally deploy sturdy deterrent responses in checkmating the tendencies of the other actors. But it requires a high degree of altruistic leadership-dispositions for representatives of affronted states to speak in such dependable dimensions. Transactional leaders cannot record such diplomatic deeds, in the absence of which international cooperation soon begins to be akin to international unconsciousness.

CONCLUSION

Under the behavioural constructs of this contribution, it is reiterated in conclusion that state entities are doomed when under human captivity. The paper submits in the same regards that the Nigerian nation has remained under the captivity of its run-of-the-mill elite actors. Nigeria's domestic environment has in consequence continued to weaken its giant-sized international relations capabilities. The country's domestic impairments have thus continued to beget for the African-giant-state, frequent scornful diplomatic relations from the other actors on the international scene. Corruption, egotism and venality of the leadership class remain the central contributory issues in the nation's domestic derailments. The ostensible African goliath has thus remained under the governance detention of its own leadership nationals, while the citizen-bystanders watch nearly helplessly, as the unlucky state-tiger remains in anguish. Indubitably, the institution of some strong and altruistic leadership is the panacea against disorder in the domestic environment of international relations for this massively populated but possibly drifting African state.

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